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ABSTRACT 
 An under-sea earthquake near the west coast of Northern Sumatra set off 
a series of other earthquakes in December 2004 and led to a widespread 
disaster, Tsunami 2004. Sri Lanka faced one of the worst natural disasters 
with a large proportion of losses in housing and infrastructure. The 
developing countries are less able to face the impacts of disasters and so it 
is imperative to develop the infrastructure of the poorer nations in order to 
quip them to manage disasters. As a nation, we should demonstrate firm 
resolve in protecting infrastructures from further disasters. This paper 
affirms current infrastructure reconstruction process in Sri Lanka is 
basically hindered by the lack of institutional capacity and current security 
problems in the north and east of the country. Sri Lanka has much to learn 
from other settings and there is a strong need to develop the capacity. The 
infrastructure reconstruction programmes should also aim to change the 
vulnerable conditions for the development of the country.  
 
Keywords:  Tsunami 2004, Infrastructure Reconstruction, Disaster            
Management, Gaps, Capacity Building. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Tsunami 2004 brought to Sri Lanka the worst natural disaster ever 
recorded in recent history. Our society and modern way of life depend on a 
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 complex system of critical infrastructure. As the infrastructure consists 
primarily of transportation, electricity and telecommunications, and water 
and sanitation facilities that provide services to the public through a 
network of roads, rail, ports, airports, pipes, and lines, the effectiveness of 
infrastructure systems impact on all economic activities. The objective of 
this paper is to analyse the progress of post Tsunami infrastructure 
reconstruction within a developing country, with a special emphasis on 
identifying the prevailing gaps and lessons learned from other settings that 
will fit the Sri Lankan context.  This paper has revealed just how multi-
dimensional the infrastructure contributions to economy and disaster 
management are. A comprehensive literature review was carried out and 
the data on infrastructure reconstruction, including the present progress 
were obtained through RADA (Reconstruction And Development Agency) 
publications. 
2. INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI 2004: OVERVIEW 
On December 26, 2004, death came as small white ribbons stretched 
across the Indian Ocean horizon driven by one of the most powerful 
earthquakes in the last 40 years.  At 9.0 on the Richter scale, six miles 
beneath the seabed of the Indian Ocean, it was produced by movements in 
tectonic plates at the interface between the India and Burma plates. It gave 
birth to most devastating tsunami waves suffused in all directions. The 
devastating waves travelled from their epicentre near the west coast of 
Northern Sumatra to the western shores of Indonesia and within hours 
destroyed the coastlines of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, India, 
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Maldives, Seychelles, Kenya and Somalia. The 
tragic toll still resonates, with more than 200,000 dead; 2 million people 
displaced; 370,000 homes destroyed or damaged; some 5,000 miles of 
coastline devastated; and 2,000 miles of roads ruined (Clinton, 2006). Sri 
Lanka was one of the countries that suffered the heaviest losses. 
3. EFFECT OF TSUNAMI 2004 ON SRI LANKA   
Generally Sri Lanka experiences frequent natural hazards in the form of 
droughts, floods, landslides, cyclones and coastal erosion affecting 
hundreds of people over the years despite the tropical climate and heavy 
rainfall. However this time Sri Lanka was hit brutally hard by the Tsunami 
causing thousands of deaths and destruction that stretched over two thirds 
of the island’s coastline with thirteen (13) outlying districts affected. The 
statistics were staggering: 35,322 people killed; nearly 516,150 people 
displaced with only memories of normal life and no homes to return to; over 
6,000 reported missing and 89,000 houses washed away (United Nations, 
2005). The tsunami compounded previously existing vulnerabilities 
resulting from civil conflict by making the north and east the hardest hit 
region. The coastal population affected ranged from an estimated 35% in 
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Kilinochchi to 80% in Mullaitivu and 78% in Ampara coastal district 
divisions, compared to the southern districts of Galle, Matara, and 
Hambantota, where less than 20% of the coastal population was affected, 
albeit with scattered pockets of severe damage 
(www.recoverlanka.net/data/SLDF05/assessment.pdf). 
 The massive damage to infrastructure and capital assets was 
estimated at $1 billion, 5% of GDP, with a large proportion of losses 
concentrated on housing, tourism, fisheries and infrastructure. Coastal 
infrastructure, namely roads, railways, power, telecommunications, water 
supply and fishing ports were significantly affected (ADB, 2006). Major 
infrastructure in the country was severely damaged, as most have been 
continuously maintained without any significant capacity upgrade for nearly 
100 years. The island’s road transport network from Colombo to 
Hambantota and some roads in the Northern and Eastern parts of the 
country were severely damaged, with approximately 800km of national 
roads, 1500km of provincial and local government roads, 25 bridges and 
causeways located in the coastal belt of the country (Palliyaguru et al., 
2006).  Electricity distribution lines were damaged abolishing the power for 
22,660 households and damaging 6500 km of service lines, 600 km of low 
voltage lines and 50 km of medium voltage lines. Water supply and 
sanitation systems were damaged making holes in water supply schemes, 
public and private wells and reticulation systems. Telecommunication 
systems in 10 districts were badly affected: with 25 telephone exchanges 
(PABX) damaged and cable networks in most of the districts experiencing 
the disaster. Several transmission towers and telephone exchanges in 
coastal belt were severely damaged. 
 The largest damage to livelihood was incurred in the fisheries and 
tourism sectors causing greater susceptibility to poverty. Eight (8) out of 
twelve (12) fishing harbours were completely destroyed leaving another 
two (2) with considerable damages.  75% of the fishing boats were 
reported to have been damaged (RADA, 2006b) including approximately 1 
million fishing nets lost. In the tourism industry 65% of the room capacity in 
the hotel sector was affected. 
 The total reconstruction cost is estimated at EUR 1.5 billion, 
anticipating 3-5 years for completion (Perera, 2006). With vast immediate 
local and international assistance, communities were able to get back 
some normality to their normal lives to a certain extent.  
4. ROLE OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN ECONOMY & DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT: OVERALL PERSPECTIVE 
The role of infrastructure in people’s daily activities and the economic 
growth of a country is apparent. Critical infrastructure is broadly defined to 
include the systems, facilities and networks that support the health, safety 
and economic well being of the population during and after natural 
disasters. These usually include transportation (road, railways and 
bridges), energy and utilities (electricity, gas), water supply and sanitation 
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 services, telecommunication systems, health services and essential 
government services (ESCAP, 2006). Four key infrastructure sectors 
namely, transport, telecommunications, energy and water supply and 
sanitation are discussed in this research paper. This will in turn open up 
access to identification and construction of solutions for challenges in 
infrastructure reconstruction thus sustaining the countries disaster 
mitigation and economic growth.  
 It is difficult to imagine a modern world without infrastructure. 
Construction represents the largest proportion of every nation’s savings. 
The physical infrastructure built through construction activity, at great 
expense, is the nation’s economic backbone as it constitutes the arteries 
for the facilitation of productive activity and spreading the benefits of growth 
by enabling goods and services to be distributed (Ofori, 2002). On the 
other hand infrastructure has strong supply and demand side economic 
linkages (ESCAP, 2006). In much the same way, infrastructure caters 
directly to demand. Improving trade efficiency can do much more to spur 
economic growth than tariff reform and improving infrastructure is a major 
factor in improving efficiency of trade. It is found that the availability of good 
quality physical infrastructure improves the climate for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by reducing the “cost of total investment” incurred by 
foreign investors and thus raising the rate of return (ESCAP, 2006). The 
creation of significant negative consequences to infrastructure, together 
with other built environment facilities due to disasters, would lead to 
pathetic economic consequences and an impoverished quality of life often 
for long periods of time. When events such as natural disasters destroy 
infrastructure, their opportunity cost becomes painfully evident. 
 Ignorance of sound infrastructure is shown in numerous ways. It 
exacerbates civil imperfections and demoralizes staff working in remote 
locations, particularly in vulnerable areas, further delaying the process of 
state rebuilding and undermining the effectiveness of rebuilding process. It 
also leads to poverty, hunger and infectious diseases. Moreover 
infrastructure failures can have an effect on gender and other aspects of 
identity and exaggerate powerlessness, vulnerability and disability (Anand, 
2005). Infrastructure failures in the post-disaster period can become the 
fundamental reason for another series of devastating effects followed by 
later natural disasters. Poor infrastructure also contributes to high logistics 
costs and high inventory levels. This is particularly significant for the Sri 
Lankan economy as initiatives in this area are lacking. Sound infrastructure 
can increase productivity, reduce the cost of production, increase trade and 
reduce poverty whereas the lack of it can create major disaster or can 
enhance the effects of disaster in completely negative manner.  
 The poor are often the main victims of disasters, as it aggravates 
inequality and hinders progress towards the development goals. Disasters 
damage the entire economy of the country including the physical and 
human resources, especially when they predominantly take place in the 
developing countries. They influence aid priorities and thus have a 
crowding-out effect. Half of the world’s natural disasters have been 
recorded in Asian countries and 70% of all floods, and much of the damage 
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inflicted by floods is to infrastructure. By some estimates, infrastructure 
losses account for 65% of all flood losses. Approximately 50% of the World 
Bank’s total lending is equivalent to total cost of damage to infrastructure 
due to natural disasters in the Asian context (ESCAP, 2006). Physical 
infrastructure can be developed to withstand disasters and reduce and 
even prevent damage from natural disasters. For instance, drinking water 
systems can be very effective for flood management. Every nation must 
take care to keep damage to critical infrastructure to a minimum during 
disasters through the necessary mitigatory measures. If such activities 
undertaken before disasters aim, in particular, at protecting these critical 
infrastructures, it would result in effective and efficient relief and 
reconstruction activities in post-disaster phases (ESCAP, 2006). Post-
disaster reconstruction is relevant to development discourse. 
Reconstruction infrastructure is often essential to sustain recovery after 
major disasters (Anand, 2005). Investment in infrastructure for disaster 
management is essential in this context and it is necessary to explore the 
management of infrastructure systems and the association between natural 
disaster reduction /mitigation with infrastructure management and 
development.  
 
 
5. REVIEW OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN POST TSUNAMI 
RECONSTRUCTION 
 
5.1 Background – Institutional Arrangements 
 
Subsequent to the Tsunami, the government set up three task forces. In 
November 2005, a single government agency was created to focus on 
reconstruction and development issues across all sectors and stakeholders 
in the affected areas. Hence, RADA is the result of a merger of all the 
Tsunami related organizations such as Task Force for Rebuilding the 
Nation (TAFREN), Task Force for Relief (TAFOR) and Transitional 
Accommodation Project (TAP) into a single organization.  
 RADA aims to improve the re-building of the affected communities. 
It has a clear objective of reducing future vulnerability through improved 
physical infrastructure (RADA, 2006b). RADA is involved in overall 
coordination of housing and those sectors from which the population 
derives their livelihood. Infrastructure sectors are largely coordinated by the 
relevant line ministries/departments with limited coordination from RADA 
except for the infrastructure related to housing in which RADA is involved 
with the relevant government institutions and donors 
(www.lankamission.org). 
 Soon after the 2004 Tsunami relevant parties recognized the need 
of a comprehensive, long term and holistic disaster risk management 
framework. The Tsunami showed the policy and institutional weaknesses 
of disaster risk management in the country. As a result, the Sri Lanka 
Disaster Management Act No 13 of 2005 was enacted in May 2005, 
2998 CIB World Building Congress 2007
 providing a solid legislative and institutional arrangement for disaster risk 
management. This established a powerful National Council for Disaster 
Management and the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) as the lead 
agency for disaster risk management (Jayawardane, 2006). Before the 
Tsunami, disaster management came under the purview of the Ministry of 
Social Services (MoSS). Later in November 2005 the Ministry of Disaster 
Management (MoDM) was established to provide undiluted leadership 
(Jayawardane, 2006). 
 Sri Lanka is now attempting to move towards a safer country 
recognizing the Tsunami as an opportunity to create sustainable 
development. The declaration of Road Map by the DMC under MoDM in 
December 2005, “Towards a Safer Sri Lanka: Road Map for Disaster Risk 
Management” aims to provide an overall framework for disaster risk 
management in the country and unify efforts of different agencies. It has 
clearly identified the emerging requirements of development and 
improvement of infrastructure in future vulnerability reduction (MoDM, 
2006). 
5.2 Progress in Different Sectors  
Already several millions had been spent on restoring basic infrastructure. 
However, although almost all the required funding has been received, in 
some cases contracts have been awarded and rehabilitation work is in 
progress, whereas in others contracts have not yet been finalised. 
5.2.1 Transport (Roads, Railways and Bridges) 
General 
 
One main focus of reconstruction is in rebuilding the roads. This includes 
rehabilitation of 1,173 Km of national roads and 25 major bridges (RADA, 
2006a). On the railways, 80 buildings (including station buildings, 
officers’/workers’ quarters, gate huts, parapet walls, culverts), 130 Km of 
track, 4 bridges, 50 signals, 5 locomotives and 8 rolling stock needs to be 
restored. 
 
Institutional Set-Up 
 
National roads are handled by the Road Development Authority (RDA) and 
others by provincial and local governments (RADA, 2006a). 
 
Achievements 
 
The immediate repairs were carried out within two week of the Tsunami 
enabling roads and bridges useable. 135 Km of national highways and five 
5 major bridges are nearing completion on the southern coast. Tenders 
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have to be awarded for another 149 Km of national highways and 
procurement is likely to be completed by March 2007. Other bridges are in 
tendering or design stage or not yet commenced. It is expected that 5 more 
bridges will be completed in 2007, 12 in 2008, and 1 in 2009. Over 1000 
Km of national B and C roads are under or entering construction. However, 
the major roads stop after Ampara district as conflict prevents construction 
further north. With regards to railway reconstruction 75% of the buildings 
have been rebuilt, damaged track on the coast line (Colombo–Matara line, 
Trincomalee line and Batticalo line) was restored within two months after 
Tsunami, 40% of the signal system has already been restored, 2 
locomotives and 3 coaches were recovered and are back in use. The large 
infrastructure projects require a long process of planning and preparatory 
work before the construction work actually starts. Most of the 
reconstruction of roads will therefore end in 2008/2009 (RADA, 2006a and 
RADA, 2006b). 
5.2.2 Telecommunications 
General 
 
The recovery activities were organised into several phases: emergency 
responses, restoration and repair, reconstruction of the destroyed for 
functional replacement, reconstruction for redevelopment and emergency 
communication.  
 
Institutional Set-Up 
 
Department of Meteorology is responsible for tracking and notifying the 
public about potential weather emergencies and other hazards.  Sri Lanka 
Telecom is responsible for the restoration of telecommunication systems. 
 
Achievements 
 
Other than the immediate responses to damaged telecommunication 
infrastructure, a few early warning systems have been constructed and 
others are in progress. Infrastructure for necessary data collection and 
decision making on emergency situations, particularly to facilitate the public 
with required information on time, have been funded and are currently in 
progress. 
5.2.3 Energy (Electricity) 
General 
 
The government has planned a three stage approach to rebuilding the 
electricity energy supply. The first phase will focus on providing a supply of 
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 electricity to temporary settlement camps, replacing the damaged network, 
and providing a supply to all relocated families.  The second stage 
envisages further network development to cater for new loads that would 
come as a result of the new infrastructure development. The third stage will 
focus on additional infrastructure, catering to long term planning for a 
period of 10 to 15 years including service connections to a projected 
23,000 new Tsunami affected houses (RADA, 2006a). 
 
Institutional Set-Up 
 
Power management, generation, transmission and distribution are under 
the authority of the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) (RADA, 2006a). 
 
Achievements 
 
Immediate electricity restoration was carried out and temporary settlement 
camps were supplied with temporary electricity soon after the Tsunami. 
The damaged network has been replaced and almost all the relocated 
families have access to electricity. Within the first phase CEB was able to 
restore power supply within two months of the Tsunami in all affected 
areas. CEB has almost fully completed the network development 
requirements under the second stage by reinstating and newly constructing 
high tension and low tension distribution lines and substations. Already 
CEB has connected 17,928 new Tsunami houses (RADA, 2006b). 
5.2.4 Water Supply & Sanitation 
General 
 
Arrangements have been made to carry out a three stage approach to 
rebuilding the water supply and sanitation infrastructure. The first phase 
focused on the immediate need fulfilment. The second stage focused on 
immediate service restoration to pre Tsunami level and the main target is to 
restore the service by end of year 2006. The third stage will provide service 
expansion and augmentation to meet medium and long term needs and 
aims to restore the service by mid of year 2008.  
 
Institutional Set-Up 
 
The National Water Supply and Drainage Board (NWSDB) is the agency 
responsible. RADA’s Infrastructure unit works closely with this unit and also 
helps in getting donor assistance (RADA, 2006a). 
 
Achievements 
 
As water supply and sanitation is an essential day to day requirement, 
immediate restoration was carried out soon after the Tsunami. Affected 
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wells were emptied and disinfected within a month. Under long-term 
reconstruction 130 water related projects are expected to be implemented. 
Donors have committed funds for 96 projects in progress (RADA, 2006a). 
Most of the projects would not be completed as originally planned due to 
the various constraints. 
 
 
6. IDENTIFIED GAPS IN INFRASTRUCTURE RECONSTRUCTION 
 
6.1 Lack of Institutional Capacity 
 
The capacity of developing countries in facing natural disasters is minimal 
(Ofori, 2002) and Sri Lanka is one of the countries least capable of coping. 
However reconstruction and rehabilitation activities of infrastructure in the 
post-disaster period need to be carried out efficiently. Thus infrastructure 
reconstruction usually takes a long time after a disaster (ESCAP, 2006). 
Capacity, at local government level, to plan and implement recovery 
strategies is usually very limited and often incapacitated as a result of the 
disaster. Stable and secure post-disaster recovery and long term 
development is threatened by institutional constraints, lack of access to 
and inappropriate use of professional skills and knowledge to support local 
effort. 
 Poor standards within the local construction industry have resulted 
in the frail pace of reconstruction in all infrastructure sectors, further 
enhanced by the lack of institutional capacity. For instance, the formulation 
and lack of enhancement of NWSDB project management and monitoring 
capacity are serious issues that badly affect the expected success of 
ongoing and future projects. Deficiency in capacity appears in the form of 
lack of drive to commence sanitation studies and develop sewerage for 
new settlements. In the power sector, planning difficulties have arisen in 
electricity reconstruction resulting in lack of any overall power requirement 
for housing and other reconstructions such as roads/bridges, schools, 
hospitals and public buildings. Local contractors’ lack capacity in terms of 
numbers of contractors, equipment availability, size and skills of the labour 
force and management practices is a major constraint in the transportation 
sector (RADA, 2006a). 
6.2 Security Problems/ Communication Barriers 
Security problems in the country have now brought reconstruction in the 
north and east to a near standstill. The security situation in the north and 
east has worsened from late 2005. For instance the Post Tsunami 
Operational Structure (PTOMS) was proposed in early 2005 whereby the 
government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would share 
decisions on Tsunami aid allocations in the north and east. However, 
discussions were drawn out on this until finally it was declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court at the end of 2005. This caused a 
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 one year delay for many donors work in the north and east. Construction 
agencies have restricted access to LTTE controlled areas. Without a 
ceasefire agreement the Tsunami reconstruction in the north and east will 
not be completed effectively. However, donors are seeking to take 
mitigation measures to keep on with their work in the north and east  such 
as focusing on areas where work can continue for the present (eg. as in 
Ampara). Delays occur in road and bridges rehabilitation projects simply 
due to off loading and re-loading of materials at Sri Lankan Army and LTTE 
check points.  
6.3 Equity Problems 
The aid allocated for the northern and eastern part of the country has been 
less effective because of disruption by caused by conflict and now by the 
effective freezing of operations. The situation is made particularly worse as 
this part of the country suffered double calamities - the devastating 
Tsunami and by the effects of 20 years of conflict. The north and east of 
the country accounts for 60% of the damage yet have received less 
financial assistance compared to the south. In terms of energy rebuilding 
(electricity), lack of donor funding for stage two and stage three has 
hampered progress of work. On the other hand road reconstruction 
projects suffer from less access to finance. 
6.4 Procurement Delays and Non Availability of Materials  
The government’s procurement methods are very lengthy and tedious 
which makes the reconstruction process very slow. For example, 
procurement problems with regard to tools, equipment and vehicles for 
implementation/supervision have caused serious delays in water supply 
and sanitation projects. Delays in the procurement process in the electricity 
restoration projects and increased materials requirement has also hindered 
the expected pace of progress in the restoration exercise. On the other 
hand non-availability of suitable rock for road works has delayed road 
reconstruction work. 
6.5 Inefficient Management and Coordination 
RICS, “Mind the GAP report” by Lloyd–Jones (2006) highlights the 
ineffectiveness of medium-term recovery and long-term reconstruction due 
to lack of planning and coordinated management in the post-disaster 
recovery phase despite the huge improvements in the emergency 
response. Stable and secure post-tsunami infrastructure reconstruction is 
threatened by gaps in communication and failures in management and 
planning. Because of the different types of organizations and interest 
involved, the link between immediate humanitarian relief and the long-term 
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reconstruction is often poorly managed. For instance, coordination has 
been hampered by donors, NGOs and the government. NGOs often do not 
coordinate their actions effectively. Government suffers from overlaps 
between ministries, especially from the lack of clarity due to the 
competences of line ministries and RADA set up for Tsunami. 
Development partners in part failed to (i) coordinate with government 
authorities at the central and local level, (ii) link up actions and (iii) do 
cross-sectoral programming. On the second anniversary of the Tsunami, a 
situation can be seen where reconstruction in the south has gone ahead 
relatively well while the north and east has not advanced nearly as far. 
7. WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM OTHER SCENARIOS  
Central California experienced an earthquake of 6.5 in magnitude in 2003, 
which resulted in two deaths and 40 people being injured. By comparison, 
the 6.6 earthquake, which hit Iran four days later, killed over 40,000 people. 
Both events took place in areas with high-density populations. This gives a 
clear indication of how poor the developing countries are in case of natural 
disasters. Lloyd–Jones (2006) has identified the necessity of developing a 
worldwide network of trained professionals, ready to join recovery and 
reconstruction teams working with affected people. The International 
exchange of best practices and knowledge sharing among practitioners, 
authorities and NGOs, particularly from the region, can significantly 
contribute to capacity building at all levels. The need for the working out of 
an effective framework for drawing on analysis of systems failures and 
success seen in past disasters has also been emphasised by Lloyd–Jones 
(2006).  
 The report, “Enhancing regional cooperation in infrastructure 
development including that related to disaster management” by the 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) 
identified initiatives taken by a range of institutions in achieving important 
factors in dealing with disasters. These included infrastructure development 
for disaster prevention, critical infrastructure protection during disasters and 
efficient reconstruction of infrastructure in the post-disaster. The report also 
took into account the combined efforts by all sectors to plan ahead for 
disasters, build capacity and strengthen institutional arrangements, 
including legislation that covers land-use regulations, building codes and 
environmental protection. Other initiatives included: drawing up an 
integrated disaster risk management plan covering multi hazard risk 
considerations to guide the post-Tsunami reconstruction programme and in 
general all development programmes; early warning systems; training and 
public awareness programmes; emergency response management; 
recovery resources and strengthening community-based organisations. As 
location is a key factor determining levels of risk, land-use plans and 
mapping are useful tools for identifying the most suitable usage of land in 
vulnerable areas such as in determining the location of buildings, roads, 
power plants and fuel storage depots (ESCAP, 2006). Even though Sri 
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 Lanka is a member of ESCAP, it was sluggish compared to the progress 
achieved by other member countries (ESCAP, 2006). However with 
intensified globalisation, the capacity of individual countries is not enough 
to meet the scale and scope of the Asian and Pacific region’s infrastructure 
needs and their effective fulfilment and thus require regional solutions to 
complement national efforts, regional cooperation in both infrastructure 
development and its financing (ESCAP, 2006). The rebuilding of social 
institutions and capacity of communities is as crucial as all others.  
 Awareness and knowledge of disaster risk reduction should be 
created from professional education through to primary and secondary 
education. National and local authorities, NGOs and the public should be 
routinely trained and have exercises in disaster management as part of 
their civil servant training. They could then share their experiences through 
identified means, such as conducting short training courses, which could 
help maintain a well functioning system to respond.  Setting up of regional 
centres of excellence to promote training, awareness raising and the 
exchange of knowledge between developing countries could do a lot within 
the disaster management philosophy. Even though research is undertaken 
in particular disciplines, there should be a proper mechanism for the 
transference of knowledge from research institutions to the market, 
government and professionals.  The integration of sustainability awareness 
into mainstream education, graduate and continued professional education 
is of paramount importance to improve sustainability awareness and skills. 
The European Commission is taking a number of measures including 
capacity building of major partners, strengthening the Commission’s 
network of humanitarian experts and supporting the development of the 
rapid assessment and response capacity of the UN and other key partners. 
Additional measures foreseen include establishing a network of member 
states humanitarian emergency focal points to ensure a more coherent EU 
response. 
 In Sri Lanka some of these infrastructure facilities have been 
continuously maintained without any significant capacity upgrade for nearly 
100 years. For example, the railway network in Sri Lanka has not been 
extended since it was introduced under the British rule. Even within the 
post-tsunami context Sri Lanka faces predicaments in maintenance of 
water/gully bowsers and packaged water treatment plants and securing 
counterpart funding (VAT/Duty) (RADA, 2006a). Thus infrastructure 
planning and design in the post disaster period must accomplish the 
remedial solutions for missing baseline. The post disaster reconstruction 
process needs to address not only infrastructure that may have been 
damaged in the disaster but also infrastructure that never existed or 
damaged due to lack of maintenance over years.  Infrastructure 
management at long term recovery phase must involve disaster reduction 
or mitigatory measures. For example maintenance is a major issue for all 
transport modes. This includes preventative maintenance, such as sealing 
cracks in road pavements, grading shoulders and cleaning drains to 
minimize the incidence of wash-aways, as well as planned rehabilitation. 
Regular road maintenance offers major benefits yet is so neglected in 
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some developing countries like Sri Lanka that every additional rupee spent 
on maintenance and rehabilitation saves twice as much in reconstruction 
costs and reduced wear and tear on vehicles (ESCAP, 2006).  
 The cost of communications breakdowns during the Tsunami was 
enormous. While seismic monitoring stations throughout the world detected 
the massive sub-sea earthquake that triggered the Tsunami, a lack of 
procedures for communicating these warnings to governments and 
inadequate infrastructure in the country delayed the transmission of 
warnings. Sri Lanka must develop proper telecommunication and early 
warning systems to save lives during disasters. 
8. THE WAY FORWARD 
In Recent research and current research gaps’ by Talbot, identifies the 
growing interest in education in emergencies and reconstruction as a 
research field. Education in emergencies and early reconstruction is a 
newly emerging field of academic research, policy research and teaching.  
 The professional skills and expertise in the built environment will be 
more crucial in the future, in countries like Sri Lanka, particularly in the 
more remote regions. However professionals, with appropriate skills and 
training, have key roles to play during all disaster phases. This requires 
trained built environment professionals to “think outside the box’” and to 
work with each other, with other professional intermediaries (e.g. the 
medical profession) and with skilled, non-professional intermediaries, to 
make the most cost effective use of their existing skills and knowledge. 
Thus the development of a skills plan and creation of learning opportunities 
in the realm of post-disaster reconstruction would build the capacity of 
educational institutions and produce the relevant professionals to cater for 
the demand. Identification of skills gaps is very important in developing the 
capacities and providing support for institutions, both governmental 
(national and local), non governmental (NGOs, private sector and other 
civil society organizations) in the form of knowledge inputs, technical 
support, institutional building and systems development. Thus identification 
skills and capacity gaps at post-disaster long-term reconstruction phase 
are an emerging research field.   
9. CONCLUSION 
As natural disasters often hit the least developed areas and the most 
disadvantaged groups hardest, the reconstruction programmes should aim 
to change the vulnerable conditions through development programmes.  
Low pre-disaster development leads to slower recovery and then 
an even slower progress of long-term reconstruction. As a result of the 
prevailing conflict in the northern and eastern parts of the country, the pace 
of infrastructure reconstruction is slow but an acceptable recovery has 
been achieved in the southern part of the country. Even so, this paper 
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 affirms current infrastructure reconstruction process in all affected areas is 
basically hindered by the lack of institutional capacity. Therefore necessary 
actions must be taken to enhance the institutional capacities particularly in 
government, local institutions together with NGOs, professionals and the 
public as a whole. Sri Lanka has much to learn from other settings and 
must convert this fatal event to an opportunity to introduce measures to 
reduce future disaster risk through new physical infrastructure. 
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